⚡ AWS SCS-C03 — Cram Jam

Last-minute dense recall sheet · read fast, stash in memory. Not a substitute for the full guide.
65 Q · 170 min · pass 750/1000
50 scored + 15 unscored · $300 · 3-yr valid
IAM 20% · Infra 18% · Data 18% · Detect 16% · IR 14% · Govern 14%
Full guide

Shared Responsibility & IAM Logic

  • Shared Responsibility: AWS = security OF cloud; you = security IN cloud.
  • Explicit Deny > any Allow. Default = implicit deny.
  • Effective perms = intersection of identity + resource policy + boundary + SCP + RCP.
  • Same-account: either side allows. Cross-account: both sides must allow.

Detection (16%)

JobService
Threat detection, no agentsGuardDuty
Aggregate findings vs standardsSecurity Hub
Root-cause graph/investigationDetective
CVE scan EC2/ECR/λInspector
PII discovery in S3Macie
Config compliance + remediationConfig
Normalized security data lake (OCSF)Security Lake

CloudTrail: mgmt events default/free, data events off by default ($). Insights = ML anomaly volume/error spikes. Org trail = can't be disabled by members. Flow Logs = metadata not payload.

Incident Response (14%)

Compromised EC2: isolate (quarantine SG) → snapshot/memory capture → revoke creds → investigate (Detective) → restore from clean AMI.

Leaked access key: deactivate → review CloudTrail → rotate downstream → explicit Deny → delete.

Compromised role: explicit Deny → revoke active sessions (kills existing temp creds) → tighten trust policy.

Order matters: isolate → investigate → remediate → recover.

Test IR plans: FIS (fault injection), Resilience Hub (recovery objectives). Automate: Automated Forensics Orchestrator for EC2, Step Functions, EventBridge, Application Recovery Controller.

Infrastructure Security (18%)

ThreatUse
SQLi/XSS, rate-limit HTTPWAF
DDoSShield (Adv=$3k/mo, 24/7 DRT)
VPC-wide stateful/domain filterNetwork Firewall
3rd-party inline inspectionGWLB (GENEVE)
Zero-trust app access, no VPNVerified Access
Block malicious DNSR53 Resolver DNS Firewall

SG = instance, stateful, allow-only. NACL = subnet, stateless, allow+deny, numbered. IMDSv2 = token required, blocks SSRF credential theft. Admin access → SSM Session Manager (no bastion, logged).

Gateway endpoint (S3/DynamoDB, free) vs Interface/PrivateLink (other services, $). Direct Connect + MACsec = encrypt the dedicated link itself.

Identity & Access Mgmt (20%)

ScenarioUse
Workforce SSO, many accountsIAM Identity Center
Customer sign-in for appCognito User Pool
Exchange token → AWS credsCognito Identity Pool
CI/CD, no stored keysOIDC + AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
Non-AWS workload needs AWS credsIAM Roles Anywhere
3rd party assumes your roleCross-account role + external ID
Fine-grained app-level authzVerified Permissions (Cedar)

ABAC = tag-matching, scales across teams. Permissions boundary = caps max perms of an identity. Session policy = caps one AssumeRole session. Access Analyzer = external + unused access findings.

Data Protection (18%)

S3 modeKeys
SSE-S3AWS-owned, default
SSE-KMSCMK, auditable; Bucket Keys cut KMS calls
SSE-Cyou supply per-request
DSSE-KMSdual-layer AES-256

EBS/RDS encryption set at creation; re-encrypt = snapshot→copy w/ KMS key→restore. Secrets Manager = built-in rotation. Parameter Store = cheaper, no rotation. Object Lock = WORM.

Imported KMS key material does NOT auto-rotate — only AWS-generated keys do (annual).

Security Foundations & Governance (14%)

NeedUse
Cap max perms, your principals org-wideSCP
Restrict access to your resources (incl. outside org)RCP
Enforce a config state directlyDeclarative policy
Governed landing zone fastControl Tower
Share resources across accountsRAM
Self-service governed productsService Catalog
Central WAF/Shield/SG policy org-wideFirewall Manager
Continuous audit evidenceAudit Manager
AWS's own compliance reportsArtifact

SCP/RCP never grant — only cap. Delegated admin account runs GuardDuty/Security Hub/Macie/Firewall Manager org-wide, not the management account.

KMS Deep Cuts

  • Key policy is the root of trust. IAM alone is not enough: the key policy must delegate to IAM ("Principal":{"AWS":"arn:aws:iam::111122223333:root"}) or no IAM policy can reach the key.
  • Envelope encryption: KMS wraps a data key; the data key encrypts the data. GenerateDataKey returns plaintext + ciphertext copy.
  • Grants = temporary, programmatic, granular; used by AWS services on your behalf. Key policy = durable. IAM = account-wide.
  • Rotation: AWS-generated symmetric CMK rotates annually, old material retained for decrypt. Imported material and asymmetric keys: no auto-rotation.
  • Multi-Region keys = same key ID + material in several Regions, so ciphertext is portable. Independent keys are not.
  • AWS managed (aws/service) = free, no policy control. Customer managed = $1/mo, full policy + rotation control, required for cross-account.
  • CloudHSM = single-tenant, FIPS 140-2 Level 3, you own the keys and the availability problem.
Cross-account KMS needs three things: key policy allows the external account, that account's IAM policy allows the call, and the resource policy allows the action.

Logging: What Records What

QuestionSource
Who called which APICloudTrail management events
Who read/wrote an S3 objectCloudTrail data events (off by default, $)
Unusual API volume / error spikeCloudTrail Insights
Accepted/rejected traffic metadataVPC Flow Logs (no payload)
Which domains an instance resolvedRoute 53 Resolver query logs
HTTP request detail at the edgeALB / CloudFront access logs
Splunk-style search over log filesCloudWatch Logs Insights
OS / app internalsCloudWatch agent (nothing else sees inside the guest)

Tamper evidence: log file validation (digest files) + S3 Object Lock + a separate, restricted log-archive account. Org trail cannot be turned off by a member account.

Condition Keys That Decide Answers

KeyWhat it pins
aws:PrincipalOrgIDCaller is in my org, no ARN lists
aws:SourceArn / aws:SourceAccountConfused deputy fix for service principals
aws:SecureTransportDeny plaintext HTTP
aws:PrincipalTag / aws:ResourceTagABAC matching
kms:ViaServiceKey usable only through a named service
kms:EncryptionContextBinds ciphertext to a context, authenticated
s3:x-amz-server-side-encryptionReject unencrypted PUTs
aws:SourceIp / aws:SourceVpceNetwork-pin a resource policy
sts:ExternalIdThird-party role assumption
aws:MultiFactorAuthPresentRequire MFA for sensitive actions
If a question says "without maintaining a list of account IDs," the answer is almost always aws:PrincipalOrgID.

Hard Numbers

  • KMS scheduled key deletion: 7–30 day waiting window.
  • GuardDuty free trial: 30 days.
  • Shield Advanced: $3,000/month per org, 1-yr commitment.
  • Secrets Manager: rotation as often as daily; no built-in rotation in Parameter Store.
  • Passing score: 750/1000. Exam: 65 Q (50 scored + 15 unscored), 170 min, $300.

Keyword → Answer

  • "no long-lived keys, non-AWS workload" → IAM Roles Anywhere
  • "CI/CD assumes role, no stored keys" → OIDC federation
  • "immutable, tamper-evident logs" → S3 Object Lock + log file validation
  • "third-party firewall appliance inline" → Gateway Load Balancer
  • "zero trust, no VPN client" → Verified Access
  • "cap what my accounts can ever do" → SCP
  • "restrict who reaches my resource, even outside org" → RCP
  • "dedicated HSM / FIPS 140-2 L3" → CloudHSM
  • "secret needs auto-rotation" → Secrets Manager
  • "find unintended external access" → IAM Access Analyzer
  • "normalize logs for a SIEM" → Security Lake (OCSF)

Top Traps

SCP/RCP ≠ grant · WAF(app-layer) vs Shield(DDoS) vs Network Firewall(VPC-wide) · KMS(managed) vs CloudHSM(dedicated/FIPS-L3) · Gateway(free) vs Interface(paid) endpoint · Secrets Manager(rotates) vs Parameter Store(doesn't) · same-account(either side) vs cross-account(both sides) · imported KMS key material never auto-rotates · isolate before investigate before remediate before recover

Read the last sentence first: "MOST secure," "LEAST operational overhead," "with LEAST disruption" — that qualifier picks the winner between two right-looking answers.

Domain Weights

Domain%
4 · Identity and Access Management20
3 · Infrastructure Security18
5 · Data Protection18
1 · Detection16
2 · Incident Response14
6 · Security Foundations and Governance14
Cram Jam · AWS SCS-C03 · pairs with the full study guide · verify limits/pricing against current AWS docs · not affiliated with AWS.