| Job | Service |
|---|---|
| Threat detection, no agents | GuardDuty |
| Aggregate findings vs standards | Security Hub |
| Root-cause graph/investigation | Detective |
| CVE scan EC2/ECR/λ | Inspector |
| PII discovery in S3 | Macie |
| Config compliance + remediation | Config |
| Normalized security data lake (OCSF) | Security Lake |
CloudTrail: mgmt events default/free, data events off by default ($). Insights = ML anomaly volume/error spikes. Org trail = can't be disabled by members. Flow Logs = metadata not payload.
Compromised EC2: isolate (quarantine SG) → snapshot/memory capture → revoke creds → investigate (Detective) → restore from clean AMI.
Leaked access key: deactivate → review CloudTrail → rotate downstream → explicit Deny → delete.
Compromised role: explicit Deny → revoke active sessions (kills existing temp creds) → tighten trust policy.
Test IR plans: FIS (fault injection), Resilience Hub (recovery objectives). Automate: Automated Forensics Orchestrator for EC2, Step Functions, EventBridge, Application Recovery Controller.
| Threat | Use |
|---|---|
| SQLi/XSS, rate-limit HTTP | WAF |
| DDoS | Shield (Adv=$3k/mo, 24/7 DRT) |
| VPC-wide stateful/domain filter | Network Firewall |
| 3rd-party inline inspection | GWLB (GENEVE) |
| Zero-trust app access, no VPN | Verified Access |
| Block malicious DNS | R53 Resolver DNS Firewall |
SG = instance, stateful, allow-only. NACL = subnet, stateless, allow+deny, numbered. IMDSv2 = token required, blocks SSRF credential theft. Admin access → SSM Session Manager (no bastion, logged).
Gateway endpoint (S3/DynamoDB, free) vs Interface/PrivateLink (other services, $). Direct Connect + MACsec = encrypt the dedicated link itself.
| Scenario | Use |
|---|---|
| Workforce SSO, many accounts | IAM Identity Center |
| Customer sign-in for app | Cognito User Pool |
| Exchange token → AWS creds | Cognito Identity Pool |
| CI/CD, no stored keys | OIDC + AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity |
| Non-AWS workload needs AWS creds | IAM Roles Anywhere |
| 3rd party assumes your role | Cross-account role + external ID |
| Fine-grained app-level authz | Verified Permissions (Cedar) |
ABAC = tag-matching, scales across teams. Permissions boundary = caps max perms of an identity. Session policy = caps one AssumeRole session. Access Analyzer = external + unused access findings.
| S3 mode | Keys |
|---|---|
| SSE-S3 | AWS-owned, default |
| SSE-KMS | CMK, auditable; Bucket Keys cut KMS calls |
| SSE-C | you supply per-request |
| DSSE-KMS | dual-layer AES-256 |
EBS/RDS encryption set at creation; re-encrypt = snapshot→copy w/ KMS key→restore. Secrets Manager = built-in rotation. Parameter Store = cheaper, no rotation. Object Lock = WORM.
| Need | Use |
|---|---|
| Cap max perms, your principals org-wide | SCP |
| Restrict access to your resources (incl. outside org) | RCP |
| Enforce a config state directly | Declarative policy |
| Governed landing zone fast | Control Tower |
| Share resources across accounts | RAM |
| Self-service governed products | Service Catalog |
| Central WAF/Shield/SG policy org-wide | Firewall Manager |
| Continuous audit evidence | Audit Manager |
| AWS's own compliance reports | Artifact |
SCP/RCP never grant — only cap. Delegated admin account runs GuardDuty/Security Hub/Macie/Firewall Manager org-wide, not the management account.
| Question | Source |
|---|---|
| Who called which API | CloudTrail management events |
| Who read/wrote an S3 object | CloudTrail data events (off by default, $) |
| Unusual API volume / error spike | CloudTrail Insights |
| Accepted/rejected traffic metadata | VPC Flow Logs (no payload) |
| Which domains an instance resolved | Route 53 Resolver query logs |
| HTTP request detail at the edge | ALB / CloudFront access logs |
| Splunk-style search over log files | CloudWatch Logs Insights |
| OS / app internals | CloudWatch agent (nothing else sees inside the guest) |
Tamper evidence: log file validation (digest files) + S3 Object Lock + a separate, restricted log-archive account. Org trail cannot be turned off by a member account.
| Key | What it pins |
|---|---|
| aws:PrincipalOrgID | Caller is in my org, no ARN lists |
| aws:SourceArn / aws:SourceAccount | Confused deputy fix for service principals |
| aws:SecureTransport | Deny plaintext HTTP |
| aws:PrincipalTag / aws:ResourceTag | ABAC matching |
| kms:ViaService | Key usable only through a named service |
| kms:EncryptionContext | Binds ciphertext to a context, authenticated |
| s3:x-amz-server-side-encryption | Reject unencrypted PUTs |
| aws:SourceIp / aws:SourceVpce | Network-pin a resource policy |
| sts:ExternalId | Third-party role assumption |
| aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent | Require MFA for sensitive actions |
Read the last sentence first: "MOST secure," "LEAST operational overhead," "with LEAST disruption" — that qualifier picks the winner between two right-looking answers.
| Domain | % |
|---|---|
| 4 · Identity and Access Management | 20 |
| 3 · Infrastructure Security | 18 |
| 5 · Data Protection | 18 |
| 1 · Detection | 16 |
| 2 · Incident Response | 14 |
| 6 · Security Foundations and Governance | 14 |